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ABSTRACT 
Moving target defense provides opportunities for adaptive defense in embedded systems. 
A great deal of work has been done on incorporating moving target defense techniques into 
enterprise systems to increase the cost to attackers and level the playing field. A smaller body of 
work focuses on implementing these techniques in embedded systems, which can greatly benefit 
from adaptive self-defense techniques. This work implements a network shuffling proof of 
concept in the Zephyr real time operating system to tackle the challenge of incorporating 
shuffling techniques into embedded systems. A host-centric, high security implementation is 
provided which maximizes attacker uncertainty and minimizes the impact of host compromise. 
Identifiers are utilized at the datalink, network, and transport layers and rotated per connection 
using keys shared between host pairs. 
Existing shuffling schemes are explored, including those targeted to IoT contexts. 
Existing limitations in protecting embedded systems are considered along with the presented by 
moving target defense. The design details and implementation of incorporating a moving target 
defense module to in the Zephyr networking stack is provided. The protection provided by the 
scheme is evaluated and it is compared to existing address shuffling schemes. Future work in 
better handling data forwarding and collisions in the proof of concept scheme are considered. 
Options for adapting and building on the scheme to meet the needs of system designers are 




CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
Embedded systems are becoming increasingly connected in a world in which adversaries 
have the advantage of carefully planning and carrying out attacks while defenders scramble to 
plug holes. Embedded systems are particularly difficult to protect as they do not have the same 
tools and techniques readily available in enterprise systems. Newer adaptive protection 
techniques being developed in traditional computing contexts provide opportunities for 
embedded systems to actively resist attacks. Network address shuffling, a popular moving target 
defense technique, allows embedded systems to significantly increase the cost of attacks. 
Implementing moving target defense techniques poses additional challenges in embedded 
systems but allows for adaptive defense to be employed. 
Significantly less work in moving target defense has focused on embedded systems 
compared to enterprise system. This paper explores challenges and opportunities in 
implementing network shuffling in embedded systems, using the open-source Zephyr real time 
operating system. Embedded systems in high security contexts such as sensitive components in 
defense platforms warrant the protection provided by moving target defense. Due to hardware 
limitations in embedded systems, existing host software is modified to implement the scheme. A 
great deal of work in moving target defense remains conceptual whereas this paper aims to 
consider implementation from a system designers’ perspective. Working through integrating 
shuffling techniques in the Zephyr network stack provides insight into how these techniques can 
be integrated in embedded systems. The implemented proof of concept reveals practical issues in 
employing moving target defense in embedded contexts. 
Chapter 2 of this paper provides an overview of network moving target defense including 
existing shuffling schemes. Chapter 3 focuses on challenges and opportunities of implementing 
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shuffling in embedded systems. Chapter 4 provides background on Zephyr and covers the 
implementation of shuffling in the Zephyr networking stack with a moving target defense 
module. Chapter 5 evaluates the implemented proof of concept including the protection it 
provides, options for adapting the scheme to different system designer’s needs, future work to 
resolve issues with wider deployment of the scheme, and a comparison of the scheme to existing 
shuffling schemes. Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes this work. 
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CHAPTER 2.    NETWORK MOVING TARGET DEFENSE  
2.1 Overview of Network Moving Target Defense 
Moving Target Defense seeks to level the playing field between attackers and defenders 
by creating adaptive defenses that increase the cost of attacking a system. Traditionally, attackers 
have a great deal of time and resources to analyze static targets to find vulnerabilities and carry 
out attacks. Defenders must continually discover and mitigate vulnerabilities throughout entire 
systems and attempt to detect attacks by adversaries. Adversaries need only find a few holes 
across many interconnected systems to meet their goals, while defenders struggle to find and 
mitigate all issues in their system and detect attacks. Moving Target Defense (MTD) disrupts this 
paradigm by making systems dynamic rather than static. Continuous changes to attack surface 
remove the static view of systems and vulnerabilities normally gathered by adversaries prior to 
attacks. Systems can also change dynamically during attacks, making it difficult for them to 
succeed. 
Network Moving Target Defense (NMTD) primarily focuses on shuffling network 
identifiers to make it difficult for adversaries to establish a consistent view of the network and 
target hosts. Identifiers such as ports and addresses are mutated periodically to make it appear as 
if the hosts on the network and their interactions have changed. Systems that attempt to detect 
attacks may also mutate in response to a potential attack to further confound adversaries. Many 
schemes make use of a central controller that either handles translation transparently via the 
network infrastructure or via both network infrastructure and host agent interaction. NMTD 
Schemes generally rely on the use of software defined networking and or custom host agent 
software to handle translation and mutation. Frequency of mutation, network protocols used, and 
identifiers that are mutated vary based on the scheme and the implementers preferences. More 
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frequent rotation increases overhead but limits how long adversaries have current information on 
the network. Using IPv6 instead IPv4 allows for much larger address spaces in which to perform 
mutation and is a common proponent of schemes. Adding ports to the MTD scheme in addition 
to addresses increases the identifier space and creates additional uncertainty about network 
services running on hosts. 
Comprehensive reviews of current research in moving target defense are provided by [1] 
and [21]. A review focusing specifically on network moving target defense is provided in [20]. A 
variety of existing moving target defense schemes are evaluated in [19]. Key properties required 
for an effective MTD scheme are explored in [11]. The vulnerability of network moving target 
defense to host profiling and traffic analysis are shown in [10], along with suggestions to 
mitigate the effectiveness of these analysis techniques. A variety of NMTD schemes are 
reviewed in the following section to present an overview of existing implementations. 
2.2 Network Moving Target Defense Schemes 
MT6D [5] is a distributed network moving target defense scheme that makes use of 
shared symmetric keys to derive IPv6 addresses. MT6D encapsulates the original packets in a 
tunnel and allows for the use of gateways or host only implementation. Improvements to MT6D 
are explored in [2], making use of a modified implementation of mobile IPv6 to resolve issues 
with address collisions and connection synchronization in MT6D. RPAH [3] implements a key 
pair and gateway coordinated scheme in which server host agents handle port translation while 
network gateways transparently handle network address translation as well as port translation for 
clients. Only currently valid address combinations between hosts that share keys are allowed 
through gateways. SDMA [13] performs routing based on address tokens in which valid address 
tokens are provided to authorized hosts via DNS server. Host agents handle translation of ports 
and network addresses. 
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PHEAR [12] makes use of packet header randomization to make connections anonymous 
to unauthorized network users. Addresses are random nonces and communications are managed 
by gateways and an SDN controller. ORHM [8] makes use of OpenFlow and SDN controllers to 
transparently provide rotating virtual IP addresses for hosts. Forwarding devices automatically 
handle the address translation on behalf of hosts. Senders receive the current virtual IP address 
for a remote host from a DNS server that interacts with the SDN controller. An SDN scheme that 
performs IP and MAC address rotation on end hosts via the use of NAT rules and host 
OpenFlow agents is provided in [9]. The SDN controller coordinates addresses and address 
rotation across network elements. RHSM [6] makes use of an SDN controller to coordinate 
network address and port mutation. FVRM [4][7] implements a similar scheme that also 
performs network address and port mutation via an SDN controller but provides unique IP 
addresses per each connection on a host rather than a single IP per host. 
Micro MT6D [14][16][18] explores implementing MT6D in IoT devices including 
adapting it to 6LoWPAN and using lightweight cryptographic algorithms. An MTD scheme in 
wireless sensor networks is proposed [15] that makes use of single shared key on the network 
which is used in an HMAC function along with node identifiers and period data to derive 
addresses. This scheme incorporates a central controller to precompute addresses for each round 
and provide them to each node while also resolving any collisions. An MTD scheme for mobile 
ad-hoc networks is proposed in [17] that generates addresses using a hash chain based on a 
network-wide shared secret and node identifiers. Nodes choose when to change their address and 
broadcast their identifier and hash index to allow other nodes to calculate their address. Multi-
hop routing and dynamically joining networks is also supported. 
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CHAPTER 3.    SHUFFLING DEFENSE FOR EMBEDDED SYSTEM PLATFORMS 
3.1 Embedded Systems 
Embedded systems use special purpose computers designed to operate as part of a larger 
device or platform. They fulfil a variety of purposes and are widely used in devices requiring 
automated functions including vehicles, medical equipment, industrial equipment, and 
telecommunications equipment. The size, weight, and power consumption of these devices are 
limited based on the larger system they are a part. Embedded systems are commonly designed to 
control physical equipment and interact with the environment, requiring real-time capabilities 
and specialized hardware and firmware to accomplish tasks. As a result, embedded systems 
primarily implement low-level software and provide limited support for software libraries, 
frameworks, and programming languages. There are greater constraints on introducing additional 
hardware in embedded platforms and limitations to the amount of software compared to general 
purpose systems used in enterprise environments. Security solutions have few implementations 
in embedded systems compared to their wide availability in enterprise solutions. 
The combination of hardware and software limitations in embedded systems and 
limitations of adding additional components make it difficult to use existing security solutions. 
Existing solutions and implementations need to be redesigned and adapted to special purpose 
systems with specialized requirements. As embedded systems become increasingly connected, 
many of the traditional problems facing networked systems threaten these devices and platforms, 
requiring existing concepts and schemes to be adapted and implemented to protect these devices 
in their current environments. Although the nature of embedded systems generally requires 
lightweight security techniques, embedded systems in the most sensitive contexts such as 
sensitive modules in defense systems require much greater protection.   
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3.2 Potential of NMTD in Embedded Systems 
Embedded systems have limited security protection mechanisms compared to traditional 
enterprise systems but are commonly deployed in sensitive contexts, such as military systems. 
Non-traditional deployments have limitations to the amount of hardware that can be included and 
how it can be arranged within the system. Focusing on integrating network moving target 
defense shuffling techniques into existing end devices minimizes the need to introduce additional 
hardware. Additionally, developing shuffling techniques for the underlying system allows 
deployment in current operational contexts without requiring complex new technologies that 
may have limited implementation, such as software defined networking. 
Real time operating systems are commonly used to control hardware in complex systems 
and are becoming increasingly connected as embedded systems utilize networks to share data 
and allow remote control. Network protection capabilities in these systems are limited, such as 
only providing Transport Layer Security to protect data and commands in transit. Host systems 
rarely provide state of the art protection against network attacks. Standard network protection 
solutions such as host-based firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention are rarely 
implemented in real time operating systems. 
Network moving target defense shuffling techniques have potential in protecting 
embedded devices from network threats by preventing unauthorized hosts from being able to 
communicate with the device. To communicate with the embedded device and launch network 
attacks against it, an attacker must be able to locate and address the device. Implementation of 
shuffling techniques increases the difficulty of locating network devices. When devices are 
located, they only appear at the discovered address for a limited period, requiring an attacker to 
rediscover them after each mutation. Depending on the shuffling scheme and its implementation, 
an attacker’s ability to target specific devices can be severely limited. 
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3.3 High Security NMTD Scheme for Embedded RTOS 
The network moving target defense scheme proposed in this paper is intended for 
deployments with stringent security requirements in the protection of networked embedded 
systems. Significant overhead is introduced to actively cycle through network addresses with 
each host involved in communication to provide minimal opportunities for attackers. To provide 
sufficient address space and maximize uncertainty about the identity of network devices, data-
link addresses and transport layer ports are included in the shuffling in addition to network 
addresses. This creates limitations in forwarding depending on the underlying medium and 
technologies deployed. The current implementation is best suited to networks in which devices 
can directly send data-link frames to one another (e.g. hub networks, bus networks, and mesh 
networks). Future work and adaptations to better support forwarding are considered in section 5. 
Communicating hosts share a cryptographically random key that is used along with 
connection and period specific information as input to an HMAC algorithm. The output of is 
used to derive the addresses used by each side of the connection for the current period. The MTD 
scheme provides host-based network access control as it will only accept frames that match the 
expected incoming datalink and network addresses and transport layer ports and protocol type 
expected. The default implementation only allows traffic on MTD connections, so any outgoing 
or incoming frames that do not match any MTD connection are automatically dropped, 
preventing unauthorized communications. Devices are expected to be preconfigured with shared 
keys prior to deployment based on the connections required by system applications. 
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CHAPTER 4.    IMPLEMENTING SHUFFLING IN ZEPHYR 
4.1 Overview of Zephyr 
The Zephyr Project [24] is a Linux Foundation Project to provide an open source 
community governed RTOS to meet the needs of embedded system and IoT developers. Zephyr 
presents itself as an alternative to commercial RTOS offerings while allowing vendors to be 
involved in shaping its development to meet the needs of embedded systems and IoT 
communities. Zephyr provides a lightweight RTOS kernel as well as a collection of drivers and 
subsystem modules to support a wide variety of applications with a limited footprint. 
The Zephyr Project provides a long-term support (LTS) branch to provide a stable API 
and ongoing support for an extended period. Extended security updates, maintenance and support 
on a stable version provides a useful baseline for system integrators. Due to the benefits of LTS, 
the Zephyr LTS branch 1.14 has been selected for implementing NMTD shuffling techniques. 
The 1.14 branch includes minor versions for the inclusion of fixes and patches in the form 
1.14.x. 1.14.2 is the specific version used during development as it was the latest available at the 
time of development. Documentation on developing applications with Zephyr as well as its 
components and APIs are provided under the documents portion of its website for the selected 
version [23]. Note that version 1.14.1 of the documentation is used for the 1.14.2 branch at the 
time of writing. 
4.2 Zephyr Networking Stack 
Zephyr provides support for commonly used network protocols and technologies 
including the TCP/IP networking stack, TLS, Ethernet, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and 
802.15.4/6LoWPAN. Additional application protocols commonly used in IoT are also included 
such as MQTT and CoAP. For the initial implementation of the scheme, Ethernet as used as the 
10 
 
underlying data-link protocol for transferring data frames because it can be easily used in 
emulated environments. The QEMU environment for developing and testing Zephyr applications 
provides support for Ethernet communication using Linux virtual networking capabilities. 
Zephyr also provides the standard Berkeley sockets API to facilitate development of network 
applications. 
Unlike Linux, Zephyr does not provide network hooks and user space application support 
for features such as packet filtering and translation. To provide desired network behaviors in 
Zephyr that are not part of current network stack implementation, additional code must be 
introduced into the network stack. The Zephyr networking stack implementation is loosely 
organized as sockets, grouped kernel protocol modules for higher level networking protocols 
(e.g. application protocols, TCP, UDP, IPv4, and IPv6), a network interface module, grouped 
link-layer protocol modules (e.g. Ethernet), and network device drivers. There is also a core 
networking module that determines the appropriate module calls to make for processing data 
flowing through the network stack (e.g. data requested to be sent by sockets, or data waiting to 
be processed after being provided by a network device driver). 
Figure 1 [22] provides a high-level view of how incoming data flows through the network 
stack using the example of an incoming UDP packet. The Ethernet driver receives the data and 
places it in a queue to be processed by the kernel. The kernel takes in the packet in its core 
module, determines it is an Ethernet packet, then performs ethernet connection matching and 
header processing. The packet is then processed through the appropriate network interface, 
sending it through the appropriate network and transport protocol handling modules based on the 
packet’s headers while also matching the identifiers to a known connection. Once this processing 
is complete the packet data is queue in the appropriate socket for the application to read. Each 
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module strips or iterates past headers as appropriate, using buffer and packet memory handling 
functions. 
 
Figure 1. Zephyr Network Stack Receive Flow 
A similar process occurs in reverse when a socket writes a packet to be sent over the 
network, as shown in figure 2 [22]. Based on the type of socket and the interface it is bound to, 
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the appropriate transport and network protocol modules are used to prepend protocol headers to 
the data. The packet is provided to the network interface which ensures the interface is in the 
correct state and calls the appropriate data-link handling module to prepare the frame for the 
network device driver. The network device driver handles sending the frame on the network. 
 
Figure 2. Zephyr Network Stack Send Flow 
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Of note is the split between upper level network protocol processing and data-link 
network protocol processing. There is a stopping point at the network interface abstraction where 
the packet is queued to be handled in another work thread in the upper network protocol modules 
(for incoming packets) or data-link network protocol modules (for outgoing packets). Similar 
splits occur between the socket and upper layer protocol modules and between the data-link 
protocol modules and network device driver. Within each module group, processing is otherwise 
sequential and follows through all modules within the group to complete requested network 
processing. 
4.3 Zephyr Emulation with QEMU 
The Zephyr build framework has built in support for running system, images in a QEMU 
virtual machine. Both Zephyr and QEMU support x86 processors with the Intel e1000 ethernet 
driver. QEMU provides an emulation of an e1000 ethernet NIC while the underlying Linux OS 
supports Ethernet traffic over virtual network interfaces using the Linux TAP driver. To support 
multiple Zephyr VMs communicating with one another and the Linux host machine, the example 
virtual network interface setup script provided with the Zephyr networking tools was modified to 
create a TAP interface for each Zephyr VM. The script was also modified to create a bridge 
interface to connect each TAP interface together, placing all Zephyr VMs on a shared virtual 
network also available to the Linux host. Each VM is configured to attach to its own TAP 
interface when running. 
4.4 Promiscuous Mode Support 
To facilitate implementation and testing, the system is run in QEMU emulating an x86 
board. This allows the use of the Intel e1000 driver supported by both QEMU and zephyr for 
Ethernet connectivity. Further investigation into the promiscuous mode capability of Zephyr 
revealed that the networking subsystem had support for this in the kernel but that most Ethernet 
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drivers in zephyr did not support enabling promiscuous mode, including the e1000 driver. 
Unicast promiscuous mode is required for the proposed network moving target defense scheme 
as a single ethernet interface needs to be able to receive frames for multiple ethernet addresses 
including those that are not registered on it. This is also the case because Zephyr only supports 
setting a single MAC address per Ethernet interface currently. 
Although unicast promiscuous mode was not implemented in the e1000 driver in Zephyr, 
the e1000 ethernet adapter itself supports it. To support the proposed NMTD scheme, the e1000 
driver in Zephyr was modified to support enabling unicast promiscuous mode (UPE). Doing so 
required the addition of code to set the correct values in the underlying register to enable UPE as 
well as registering the newly added promiscuous mode capability and Ethernet driver API calls 
to the Zephyr networking subsystem when initiating the e1000 driver. With this addition, the 
driver now supports providing all unicast ethernet frames to the networking subsystem for 
further processing in the NMTD implementation. 
To simplify implementation and because the NTMD scheme always requires 
promiscuous mode to be enabled, the driver automatically enables it and leaves it on while 
active. The promiscuous mode API requires that the driver support the set config API for the 
ethernet promiscuous mode command, so the current implementation returns success to calls to 
enable promiscuous mode to allow the rest of the network stack to enable promiscuous mode. 
This entire feature is conditionally compiled based on the selection of promiscuous mode support 
when building Zephyr. Similar updates will need to be made to other Zephyr Ethernet drivers to 




4.5 Network Moving Target Defense Module 
Applications establish a socket that behaves as if it is sending to and receiving from a 
consistent port and address. When sending packets, the MTD logic maps the outgoing 
port/addresses to the current random port/addresses for the end host and sends the packet out to 
the network. This involves updating TCP/UDP headers and IP headers, including checksums. 
When a frame comes in, it is passed to the MTD module in the network stack prior to normal 
network processing. The datalink, network, and transport layer headers are parsed by the MTD 
module and compared against known MTD connections. If a match is found, the Ethernet, IPv4 
and TCP or UDP headers are translated to those expected by the end application and checksums 
are updated as needed before sending it up the normal network processing stack. 
When data is sent to a remote host, it is processed through the network stack normally 
and makes a call to the MTD module before being sent out to the Ethernet driver to be sent on 
the network. The MTD module compares the sending network context against registered MTD 
network contexts. If a match is found, the packet’s headers and checksums are updated before 
the buffered frame is passed to the Ethernet Driver. ARP is bypassed when sending using an 
MTD connection. the sending handler determines and sets the destination Ethernet address based 
on the MTD translation table. 
The scheme also provides access control based on registered MTD connections with 
another host. If no match is found for an incoming frame or outgoing network context, the 
function call to the MTD module returns an error and the network stack drops the frame. To 
ensure only authorized packets are sent and received, all relevant packet headers are checked 
together and must match all expected identifiers. Due to the complexity of the existing network 
stack and multiple calls to the same functions for a variety of purposes, a single entry/exit 
function call is made within the stack to perform checking and translation. This also provides the 
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benefit of more easily updating the MTD module in the future since most processing is handled 
in one place as opposed to needing to update many hooks as the network stack implementation of 
Zephyr continues to be updated. 
 
Figure 3. MTD Module Incoming Packet Processing 
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Figure 4. MTD Module Outgoing Packet Processing 
Whenever the network stack dynamically registers or unregisters a connection it calls the 
corresponding function in the MTD module which handles matching the connection to a 
registered socket that is implementing MTD. The network stack removes and re-adds specific 
connections over time based on protocol state (i.e. TCP connection state) and the current status 
of a socket, which is mirrored by calling the MTD module for every register and unregister to 
ensure it has a consistent state with the rest of the network stack. The socket’s network context is 
kept in the translation tables as a stable MTD registration. The network context associated with 
the socket also provides information on the existing connections for the socket, which are used 
during the MTD connection registration. The translation tables are stored per socket, then 
applied to the connection based on matching it to a registered MTD socket network context when 
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Figure 5. MTD Module Connection Registration Hook 
To setup an MTD socket, the user application makes an MTD register system call in 
which they provide a registered socket file descriptor, the shared key to be used for the 
connection, local context data, and remote context data. The local and remote context data are 
used along with the key to derive period specific addresses for the local and remote host, 
respectively. The caller is responsible for ensuring the local and remote context data are not the 
same. The application is granted control and flexibility in the scheme it chooses to implement for 
the context data. The application may for example use a keyword such as a host name or 
descriptive string combined with a counter or a timestamp. This allows the application developer 
to choose the scheme for rotating addresses as some implementations may not support typical 
schemes (i.e. reliable time may not be available in some embedded systems). The developer 
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An MTD address rotation system call is provided which takes the registered socket file 
descriptor and updated local and remote context data. Both upon initial registration and upon 
calling the address rotate system call, the provided key is used in an HMAC function over the 
local and remote context data to derive the local and remote addresses, respectively. The MTD 
module makes use of the MbedTLS library provided with Zephyr to provide implementation of 
cryptographic functions. This is like the TLS socket option feature that is implemented in the 
Zephyr kernel includes MbedTLS to allow applications to make use of TLS more easily. The 
output of the HMAC function is used to set random Ethernet and IP addresses as well as 
transport layer ports. Due to a limitation in the Linux kernel, the unicast address bit is masked to 
always be zero. The Linux kernel does not support treating ethernet frames with a multicast 
address bit set as unicast frames and will attempt to automatically perform multicast registration 
and forwarding, causing issues with connections. Further testing is required on real hardware to 
determine if this bit can be random in practice. 
 
Figure 6. MTD Module Registration System Call 
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Figure 7. MTD Module Rotate System Call 
TCP posed a greater challenge than UDP in handling socket registration. When a TCP 
socket listens, it automatically spins off a new socket during the TCP handshake and will begin 
sending using the new socket before the socket is returned to the application. To handle this case, 
a hook has been added to the TCP syn-ack handler to call an MTD function that manages this 
transition. The function is provided with the previous sockets context and the new socket context 
that is being registered, and copies the key and context data from the original socket into the 
newly created TCP socket being used to send and receive data. The socket connection to the 
client can be used immediately with the same connection details in the MTD scheme. 
Applications must use a single listening socket per MTD TCP connection as the scheme is not 
designed to serve multiple clients with the same initial connection. It is recommended that 
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applications close the original listening socket after the client establishes a connection and 
reopen it with the latest rotation context parameters after the client connection is terminated to 
allow a new TCP connection with the current MTD state. 
Zephyr features are selected and included using Kconfig. To support MTD, additional 
entries were added to the kconfig options in the internet protocol kconfig options (the primary 
kconfig file for higher level network protocols) to choose to enable MTD. The MTD option entry 
has dependencies on promiscuous mode, MbedTLS, Ethernet, IPv4, UDP, and TCP. If any 
dependencies are missing, configuration warnings are presented and MTD is not compiled for 
the system image. The MTD module was also added to the network subsystem cmake source 
listing to conditionally include the MTD module source when compiling the kernel with MTD 
enabled. The network logging kconfig was also updated to add logging support for the MTD 
module, allowing the MTD module to log debug messages to assist in development and 
debugging. 
4.6 NMTD Test Applications 
To test the MTD implementation, two example Zephyr applications were created, an echo 
client using MTD, and an echo server using MTD. The applications are created in the style of 
Zephyr sample programs, allowing them to be compiled like other sample socket applications 
under Zephyr using the Zephyr build framework. The projects are configured to build the core 
networking functionality of Zephyr including Ethernet, IPv4, UDP, and TCP. The configuration 
also enables MbedTLS, MTD, promiscuous mode, the e1000 ethernet driver, and network stack 
debug logging. A macro is used to define if UDP is being used instead of TCP when compiling 
the example applications. 
The server application sets up a listening socket and waits for the client to connect and 
send data. Upon receiving data, the server sends the data back to the client. The client program 
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sends data patterns of increasing length to the server and closes the connection after completing 
the sequence. In each application, after creating the initial socket but before binding it, the 
mtd_register system call is invoked with the socket file descriptor, a shared test key, and a 
context data string of “server” for the server portion of the context and “client” for the client 
portion of the context. The client and server bind their sockets and connect to one another using 
arbitrary addresses in the application and proceed to send and receive data. After each send and 
receive, both applications call mtd_rotate, providing the socket file descriptor, and the original 
context strings with a counter appended to them, which is incremented for each call. 
The actual address that the sockets bind and connect to does not matter in the application 
as they are not used to communicate on the network. Once the registration takes place and data 
begins being sent on the network, the MTD module automatically translates the outgoing headers 
to have the appropriate identifiers. As the applications run, they output debug log messages 
showing the results of registering MTD connections and the translation of incoming and 
outgoing packets between the original identifiers the socket expects to see and the identifiers 
derived using the shared key and context data in the MTD module. Each application indicates 




CHAPTER 5.    EVALUATION AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
5.1 Protection Provided by Approach 
The MTD scheme implemented provides general protection against network attacks by 
impeding network reconnaissance and the ability to target specific hosts. By only accepting 
expected addresses during a rotation period, the scheme provides access control that prevents 
adversaries from reaching the host entirely. Adversaries perform network reconnaissance 
primarily by scanning hosts on a network and detecting what services are running on each host to 
potentially exploit. An adversary will be severely limited in attempting to scan any host that 
implements the moving target defense scheme. To successfully discover a single service, the 
adversary needs to use the correct set of identifies made up of Ethernet and IPv4 address, and 
port, for both the source and destination portion of the connection. This makes up two 48-bit 
ethernet addresses, two 32-bit IPv4 addresses, and two 16-bit port numbers, providing entropy of 
up to 192 bits. Even if a service is successfully discovered using this method (i.e. the host is on 
the local network and able to take on any address it wants) the information will only be valid 
during the rotation period, after which it is necessary to rediscover the host. 
The MTD scheme forces adversaries to adopt a more expensive strategy in which they 
must have access to monitor the network segment they are targeting and monitor ongoing traffic 
to detect valid source and destination address pairs. The attacker may be able to discern what 
service is being used during this period by analyzing the traffic, assuming it is unencrypted. The 
attacker may also attempt to impersonate one or both sides of the connection to determine the 
service being used, but this can again be mitigated using traffic encryption. If the attacker 
succeeds in identifying services used by the connection (i.e. encryption is not used), they may 
again attempt to impersonate the connection and launch an attack, but they are still limited to 
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doing this within the same period when using traditional attacker techniques. Employing 
adaptive tools and techniques would allow the attacker to attempt to trace a connection across 
address changes and launch attacks that occur within a single period. They may also attempt to 
launch specialized attacks that can adapt to addresses changing in the middle of the attack. This 
forces the attacker out of the position of having long periods of time to analyze the network, 
gather information, and carry out attacks. Attackers must instead actively attempt to determine 
the state of the network and adapt to its changing state, greatly increasing the cost of attacks. 
The most effective attacks require the adversary to compromise a node with a connection 
to another target. If the attacker can gain access to a host in the MTD scheme, they will be able 
to determine the interactions with other MTD hosts and may find vulnerabilities to exploit over 
the existing MTD connection. Another attack that remains viable, at additional cost, is 
performing network denial of service against a host. Regardless of the use of traffic encryption 
and or authentication, the attacker can monitor the network, find an active address pair, and send 
spoofed packets to force the remote hosts network stack to process the traffic. To maintain an 
attack against the same host, the attacker must employ advanced tools and techniques that 
attempt to determine the new address of the targeted host using traffic analysis and network 
profiling. This increases the cost of performing a denial of service attack by requiring tools that 
attempt to adapt the attack to the changing network addresses. 
A significant weakness in the current implementation is that the network device driver is 
configured to provide all incoming traffic to the network stack for the network stack can 
determine if it is part of a valid MTD connection. Frames that would normally be dropped by 
hardware interface are now handled in software and dropped after initial processing if they do 
not match a known MTD connection. This implementation weakness comes from limitations in 
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setting multiple addresses on network hardware. Network interface hardware that provides more 
advanced features and customization could be introduced along with a scheme update to manage 
the set of current link-layer addresses on the interface to reduce the impact of this additional 
processing. This hardware could be further adapted to offload portions of the MTD logic to 
hardware, like MT6D. 
5.2 Handling Forwarding 
The current implementation of the scheme is only intended to run in networks in which 
each host can directly send frames to another host without requiring an intermediate device to 
make forwarding decisions. Smart forwarding and routing of packets to hosts that are not directly 
reachable requires the scheme to be extended to provide wider network connectivity. Three 
approaches are proposed for extending the scheme to a wider network: introduction of one or 
more gateways, implementing the MTD scheme in forwarding devices, or limiting the address 
mutation scheme to be more compatible with existing infrastructure. 
Many embedded systems are already designed to communicate through a central gateway 
to collect data in a single location, perform more expensive computations, and handle additional 
protocols and communication technologies not implemented in the embedded node. A gateway 
could also be a generic host device that implements the MTD scheme on at least one interface to 
communicate with MTD hosts and then handles collecting and forwarding any data and 
commands between the MTD nodes and other devices. The scheme could be more easily 
implemented on a standard OS, i.e., using the Linux netfilter framework and existing network 
tools (utilized by [9] and [12]) to match the scheme implemented in Zephyr. A Zephyr node or 
similar device could also be configured with a modified scheme to allow one or more interfaces 
to connect to another network while having MTD connections with each node in the network. 
Additional care must be taken in protecting the gateway in such an approach as it becomes a 
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prime target for attackers and a method for reaching the rest of the MTD devices. Such a 
gateway could also implement a different MTD scheme on another network and translate 
between the two, acting as a proxy. 
Another option is to implement the MTD scheme in the forwarding devices themselves. 
This approach would require a significant change to the normal behavior of switching and 
routing devices but could provide for forwarding random addresses in a controlled fashion. In 
such an approach, each forwarding device would implement the MTD scheme like a gateway 
described above and would share connections with downstream MTD devices. Devices would 
communicate with their immediate switch and router to register their current connection 
addresses. Routers would register MTD connections with one another to share routing 
information to perform MTD routing. Network devices become targets of interest in this scheme 
as they know information about connections between end hosts, but interaction with forwarding 
devices can be restricted by requiring a valid MTD connection. Such a scheme would be similar 
to implementing an OpenFlow agent on each host and forwarding device and having a controller 
handle coordination, but would be more decentralized with hosts and forwarding devices 
coordinating to forward data rather than a central controller making forwarding decisions. 
A simple option that limits the effectiveness of the MTD scheme but allows it to be used 
with existing forwarding devices is to limit which layers perform address rotation and or what 
portions of an address are rotated. Disabling rotation of Ethernet addresses would allow normal 
switching to occur at the cost of significantly reducing entropy of the overall connection 
identifier and allowing adversaries target devices by MAC address (i.e. denial of service 
flooding). IP addresses could be limited to rotate within a subnet to ensure normal routing 
occurs, but this would also reduce the entropy of addresses depending on the size of the subnet 
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and also allow adversaries to target subnets when scanning. This may be a desirable option to 
implement MTD when the security provided by additional address entropy is not warranted, 
overhead needs to be reduced, and forwarding capabilities are desired without introducing 
gateways or otherwise customizing network devices. 
5.3 Combining with TLS 
Using MTD alone does not protect the data contents of network connections. Aside from 
the data being unprotected from eavesdropping, the type of data being exchanged may be used to 
track which addresses belong to which connections during each period. An eavesdropper is also 
able to view the addresses and connection details being used for data and may be able to inject 
bad data into a connection by spoofing a valid source for that address mutation period. The 
address rotation reduces the period in which such an attack can occur, and in extreme cases can 
even prevent it (i.e. per message rotation) but is not suited to mitigating these issues without 
additional protection techniques, such as Transport Layer Security. 
Zephyr has built in support for TLS connections which can be used to prevent 
unauthorized data from being injected into a connection and to protect the confidentially of data 
in the connection. In cases where implementing an MTD scheme providing access control is 
justified, or if additional protection on data content is warranted, TLS should be used by the 
network application to further protect communications. Spoofed data will no longer be accepted 
by the end application and eavesdropper will be unable to determine the contents of data to track 
connections over mutation periods. The combination of the MTD scheme and TLS provides 
significant mitigation against data disclosure, data tampering, and targeting of specific hosts. The 
combination of the implemented MTD scheme and TLS is not designed to prevent adversaries 
from identifying connections using advanced traffic analysis and profiling techniques but is 
expected to make them more costly. 
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5.4 Deciding When to Shuffle 
Deciding when to shuffle is a key issue in implementing an effective MTD solution. 
More frequent address mutation reduces the window of opportunity for attackers but introduces 
additional overhead. Many of the solutions reviewed section 2 use time as the primary means to 
decide when to shuffle. This has desirable properties but poses challenges that have an even 
larger impact on embedded systems. Using time as a metric makes it easy to judge the window of 
opportunity for an adversary to act within a single period but requires that devices involved in 
the scheme have a reliable time source and remain synchronized. Although this is normally the 
case in enterprise systems, embedded systems may not keep track of real-world. 
If the system can reliably obtain time on startup or is always able to keep a clock active to 
track time (i.e. the time component is always on in a low power state using a battery), a time-
based approach to performing address rotation is still viable. There are two potential approaches 
depending on the nature of the system. If an external clock source is available and the system can 
synchronize to it, the entire system can maintain time synchronization to manage clock skew. 
This requires that the time source can be reliably reached either via MTD or another 
communication method. A possible alternative is to consider the rate of clock skew and build in 
additional tolerance. Allowing previous and next addresses to be maintained instead of just the 
current address can allow a wider window in which devices successfully send to one another at 
the cost of having a longer period in which each address remains valid. For long-lived systems, it 
would be possible to adjust time as part of regular system maintenance. The skew rate, system 
lifetime, and frequency and maintenance would allow tradeoffs decisions on the period to use. 
A simple alternative is to base the rotation frequency on number of messages. After a 
certain number of messages are sent and or received on a connection the two systems could 
perform a rotation. This scheme is viable if the system can determine messages are being reliably 
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delivered (e.g. counting acks), but in the event of a desynchronization, manual intervention may 
be required to allow the system to communicate again. If one system is counting messages the 
other never receives or trying to talk to an offline system and continuing to rotate its address, 
when the other system is finally available and can receive messages they will not be 
synchronized. An additional challenge when only counting reliable messages is that multiple 
messages may be sent, and an earlier message may cause a rotation that causes the remaining 
messages to fail. This could be handled by resending but is prohibitively expensive. In such a 
case, it may be desirable to accepting messages on the last rotations addresses for each period to 
mitigate this loss. 
Some additional options to consider include making application context dependent 
decisions and implementing a shuffling control protocol. In a shuffling control protocol, the host 
that wants to rotate first could send a shuffle request message and provide a context data 
parameter for the peer to use. The peer can reply with a shuffle response message acknowledging 
the request and providing its own context data to use. To provide a more robust scheme, the two 
hosts could require the successful receipt of a shuffle complete message from each side (initiator, 
followed by peer upon receiving the initiators message) on the new address to verify successful 
rotation. If this verification fails, the hosts could fall back to the previous addresses and try again 
with different parameters. In an application dependent scheme, the developer chooses a desirable 
point in time to rotate addresses. The application protocol may for example choose to rotate at 
the completion of a transaction (e.g. completion of a CoAP request and response message pair or 
completion of sending an MQTT publish message and acknowledge pair, either of which may 
span a variable number of packets depending on data size). 
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5.5 Dealing with Collisions 
 Depending on the deployment scenario, additional work is needed to ensure the 
scheme does not result in connectivity loss due to address collisions. Assuming devices can 
directly send frames to one another, they should still be correctly accepted or rejected so long as 
at least one part of address (port, IP, MAC) is not also in collision. In this scenario, both hosts 
will receive the packet, but the host will only keep the packet if all source and destination 
address and ports match the expected MTD parameters for the connection. The probability of 
this occurring in the original scheme is extremely small as this would require two pairs of 
connections to resolve to the same 192 (191 excluding Ethernet multicast bit) bits worth of 
identifiers on the connection during a rotation period. The probability of collision increases if the 
allowed addresses are limited or some layers do not implement MTD. The probability of 
collision also increases based on the number of local MTD connections. Coexistence with non 
MTD nodes would also slightly increase the probability of collision and cause unwanted packets 
to be processed by non MTD interfaces when collisions occur. If a full identifier space collision 
occurs, packets will be incorrectly sent to and accepted by hosts not part of the active connection. 
The application layer may be able to mitigate this (i.e. TLS will still reject them for using the 
wrong authentication key) but this occurrence causes a much larger problem if forwarding also 
needs to be handled. 
One solution for networks that need general forwarding capabilities is to build off the 
address change protocol considered in section 5.4. When a collision occurs that results in loss of 
connectivity, the hosts will fall back to the previous address and attempt to establish new 
addresses with different context data. The remaining problem is to deal with conflicting 
mutations that happen independently. For general purpose forwarding, the forwarding devices 
would need to understand and support the MTD scheme as discussed in section 5.2. An addition 
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would be needed to both schemes in which upstream switches and routers detect an MTD 
address collision when hosts perform rotation (i.e. detect addresses already present in switching 
or routing tables coming from an incorrect port). While forwarding the handshake, a forwarding 
device which detects a conflict drops the handshake packets, causing the handshake to fail and 
the end hosts to attempt a handshake with new addresses. If multiple devices create the same 
conflict, it is expected that all of them would fail the handshake based on the offending addresses 
being cached as in use. 
In the case where a central gateway is used for communication the gateway would be 
able to detect and address collisions because it maintains addresses with other MTD hosts on the 
network. To minimize work on non-gateway hosts the gateway can be responsible for initiating 
address rotations and providing full context data with a variation of the protocol proposed in 5.2. 
The gateway would be able to detect an address collision in advance when initiating an address 
mutation and if the parameters selected would cause a conflict it discards the initial context data 
and generates new context data until a conflict no longer occurs. This scheme ensures the 
gateway will be able to reliably tell the difference between two connections that end up colliding. 
5.6 Options for Lower Security Systems 
The existing MTD implementation can be adapted for systems that have lower security 
requirements, allowing greater interoperability and or reducing overhead. If desired, non MTD 
connections could be allowed on MTD hosts. A particular link could be marked as trusted and 
whitelisted with a known static set of addresses to accept incoming traffic in the MTD module 
without performing translation. This would expose the host on the non MTD link, potentially 
elimination the protection gained by using MTD. It would also be possible to allow all non-MTD 
connections by default and only translate matching connections. This would allow adversaries to 
discover the host and target it but could help hide certain connections and services that are only 
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performed over MTD. Overall, either change greatly reduces the protection granted by the MTD 
scheme. 
More general techniques to reduce overhead would be to disable certain address layers, 
reducing the amount of processing. Additionally, weaker cryptography can be employed. A 
smaller key can be used for HMAC, and a weaker HMAC function could be used, such as SHA1. 
The context data size could also be made smaller to reduce digest processing computation. If 
TLS is not being used, the TinyCrypt library could be used in place of MbedTLS for performing 
HMAC, which would reduce the Zephyr image code size. Finally, address rotation can be done 
infrequently to save on the cost of rotation, but at the cost of allowing an adversary more time to 
analyze connections. 
5.7 Supporting Additional Protocols 
The current implementation handles IPv4, UDP, TCP, and Ethernet, but additional 
protocols can be added to expand the existing framework. Branching paths can be introduced to 
detect the appropriate protocol at each layer, like the existing code that determines if TCP or 
UDP is being used. Additional code for handling IPv6 can be added to properly read and write 
the IPv6 header and translate IPv6 address structures using the existing IPv6 network stack code 
for reference. This greatly increases the address space available for mutation if the other devices 
in the network support IPv6. Protocol branching code can also be provided at the link layer to 
Bluetooth addresses similarly to Ethernet addresses. With Bluetooth, link keys can be pre-placed 
and make use of Bluetooth link encryption and authentication instead of using TLS if sufficient 
to meet requirements. Zephyr also supports 802.15.4 with 6LoWPAN which has significant 
differences in its stack and thus will require additional work. 802.15.4 MAC addresses can be 
handled like Ethernet addresses with the distinction of needing to support both standard EUI-64 
addresses and short addresses. Special handling for the IPv6 address and port, which are likely to 
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be in a compressed header will need to be added to handle the 6LoWPAN layer. Header 
compression will be limited based on the address space size used for random IPv6 addresses, and 
tradeoffs will have to be made between address length and reduced header sizes based on the 
system integrators use case. Appropriate handling of mesh address headers is needed if mesh 
routing is going to be implemented as part of the scheme. 802.15.4 link encryption and 
authentication can be used with pre-placed keys in place of TLS if sufficient to meet 
requirements. Wi-Fi addresses can also be handled similarly to Ethernet and WPA2 can be used 
for authentication and encryption in place of TLS. A related area of interest could be to 
randomize service set identifiers in the scheme to hide Wi-Fi infrastructure from adversaries. 
The current implementation is designed for use with application layer sockets and has not 
been integrated into network libraries that provide high level APIs that abstract away socket 
handling. Use of MTD can be made more convenient to users if implemented as part of these 
libraries. As an example, the MQTT library could be updated with conditional compilation 
features to use MTD sockets and provide function calls for the user to provide keys and context 
data for connections to the MQTT library and for the MQTT library to rotate addresses. In 
general, many of the suggested solutions, improvements, and options discussed throughout 
section 5. of this paper could be implemented in separate libraries or as conditional features to 
allow system developers and integrators to choose their desired scheme implementation. 
5.8 Comparison to Other Approaches 
The implemented scheme builds on the foundation of NMTD schemes but focuses on 
integrating the highest security approaches from each and providing host-centric implementation. 
The scheme builds heavily on the concept of deriving addresses from shared keys introduced by 
MT6D. Unlike MT6D, the scheme has reduced network traffic overhead by directly using the 
derived addresses rather than including them on top of tunneled traffic. Based on the deployment 
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environment, it is not assumed that a central controller or DNS server may be available, differing 
significantly from SDN based schemes and customer gateway schemes that centrally manage 
addresses. The scheme makes use of unique identifiers for every connection rather than using 
single identifiers per host, making it appear as if more hosts are active and making it difficult to 
resolve multiple sets of identifiers to a single host. Further, all common layers of identifiers are 
included in the scheme to maximize the address space and create additional uncertainty in 
resolving a host’s identity. An unchanging part of the identifier cannot be used to determine a 
unique host handling multiple connections. Keys are also handled per host or per connection 
(depending on if the application reuses the key for multiple connections with the same host, but 
different context data) rather than sharing a single key across an entire network. This introduces 
additional management overhead but ensures each connection is uniquely authorized, and that 
the compromise of a single host does not compromise the entire network. 
35 
 
CHAPTER 6.    CONCLUSION 
Implementing moving target defensed in embedded systems provides adaptive protection 
om increasingly networked. special-purpose systems that warrant additional security when 
deployed in sensitive contexts. Implementing a high security shuffling technique in the Zephyr 
RTOS revealed design and implementation challenges and solutions. The Zephyr network stack 
which had to be modified to implement the scheme due to the lack of rich user APIs and libraries 
present, a common theme when comparing RTOS to enterprise operating systems. The 
implemented scheme makes use of identifiers at all layers to maximize attacker uncertainty and 
avoid static identifiers that can be used to correlate connections. Using per connection identifiers 
and per host keys reveals a minimal amount of information to other network participants and 
limits the impact of host compromise. Incorporating existing support for transport layer security 
in Zephyr greatly enhances the secure provided by the scheme by further limiting spoofing 
attacks and hiding data that can be used to track connections over rotation periods. The access 
control and identity protection provided by the scheme greatly increases the work required of 
adversaries to carry out successful attacks. 
The current implementation is a working proof of concept that has limitations in terms of 
data forwarding and collision handling. Approaches for handling forwarding and address 
collisions using either distributed protocols involving forwarding devices and hosts or 
introducing gateways provides insight into future work to adapt this scheme for wider use. The 
scheme’s implementation is intended to be flexible to allow adaptation to different use cases 
including reducing overhead and introducing additional protocols. The work of this paper helps 
system designers deal with implementation challenges in RTOS systems and provides them with 
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